In a recent development that has sparked considerable debate both within and beyond Sudan’s borders, the Sudanese Army announced via its official platforms that it had successfully intercepted and captured three CH-95 drones and six smaller drones, all armed with air-to-ground munitions.
The Sudanese army says it has intercepted a landward transfer of three Chinese-made CH-95 drone, and six smaller (likely CH-92) armed drones with multiple air-to-ground munitions to the Rapid Support Force (RSF) from the UAE.
Last Monday, Sudan’s army-backed government accused the paramilitaries it is fighting of launching drones assembled in the United Arab Emirates from neighbouring Chad.
“Investigations show these drones are being assembled in the UAE and launched from Chad near the Sudanese border,” Sudan’s Foreign Minister Ali Youssef told reporters in Port Sudan.
According to the Sudanese statement, these drones were being delivered to the Rapid Support Force (RSF) from the UAE via a Chadian land border. However, new information suggests a different narrative.
According to the army’s statement, these drones were allegedly being smuggled by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) via the Chadian border. This claim, however, has been met with skepticism and has raised questions about the true nature of these events.
The Official Narrative:
The Sudanese Army’s statement was clear in its assertion that this was a significant blow against the RSF, suggesting that the interception occurred in RSF-controlled territory near Nyala, close to the border with Chad. The narrative portrayed this as part of ongoing efforts to combat the supply of weaponry to rebel forces, accusing the UAE of supporting these groups with sophisticated, Chinese-made drones.
In response, Chad denied the claims, and the Chadian Foreign Minister Abderaman Koulamallah to RFI says, “We don’t care about the boasting of Sudanese cheap generals. False, fanciful and unfounded allegations. This has to stop”
Counter Narrative and Evidence:
In a statement by the Statement by Joint Force of the Armed Movement, ” … in coordination with the Sudanese Military Intelligence Authority , has been monitoring hostile activities aimed at smuggling unprecedented dangerous weapons into Sudan. These weapons were intended to be transported from a European country through Chad to Darfur, specifically to the city of El Fasher, with the goal of seizing the city using devastating arms.”
A photograph published by the Joint Struggle Armed Movement Forces (JSAMF) shows a Chinese CH-95 drone, and armed with guided missiles which seems to include AG-300/M air-to-ground missile.
JSAMF says it also seized 6 smaller drones capable of carrying two air-to-surface missiles each. These are likely CH-92As
However, conflicting information has emerged, suggesting that the situation might not be as straightforward as described. Sources on the ground and independent analyses, including posts on X, indicate that there might have been a significant deviation from this official account.
A reliable source has revealed that a single CH-95 drone, which actually belonged to the Sudanese air force, crashed. The joint force was subsequently tasked with recovering the downed drone.
This revelation casts doubt on the Sudanese army’s initial claim and raises questions about the true circumstances surrounding the incident.
According to informed sources, rather than intercepting drones from the UAE, the Sudanese military’s joint force was actually tasked with recovering a crashed CH-95 drone that belonged to their own forces. This drone, part of Sudan’s drone inventory, could have malfunctioned or been shot down, leading to the need for recovery rather than interception.
Analyzing the Claims:
Drones and Their Origins: The CH-95 drone, known for its reconnaissance and combat capabilities, although unknown has likely been part of Sudan’s military arsenal, suggesting that the narrative of foreign supply might be an oversimplification or misdirection. The smaller drones mentioned could have indeed been part of a separate incident, but their connection to the UAE remains unconfirmed by independent sources.
Political and Military Implications: This incident highlights the complex geopolitical tensions in Sudan, where both national and international actors have vested interests. The accusation against the UAE, if unfounded, could strain diplomatic relations and complicate peace negotiations, especially when the RSF has been accused of receiving support from various foreign entities.
Verification Challenges: The lack of independent verification of such claims in conflict zones is a recurring issue. The use of social media and official military statements often blurs the line between fact and propaganda, making it crucial for any verification to be thorough and multi-sourced.
Sudan’s drone fleet
Sudan operates a small but deadly drone fleet that experts believe could turn the tide of the war. China and Iran has been supplying drones to Sudan for several years now, and the country’s military has been steadily building up its drone capabilities.
Sudanese forces also fields the Chinese-made Rainbow CH-3 drone. Sudan operates five of them acquired in 2015, and four CH-4s acquired in 2016.
Sudan also fields the Mohajer-series drones comprising of the Mohajer-2, Mohajer-4, and Mohajer-6 being the latest of them, as well as four Ababil-3 drones which they acquired in 2014, and 2 Ababil-2s acquired from HESA in 2011.
The Ababil-3 is particularly effective in urban areas, where it can fly low and evade radar detection. It can also be launched from a variety of platforms, including vehicles and boats, making it a versatile weapon that can be deployed quickly and easily.
These Sudanese MALE drones are of the same class with the Chinese-made CH-95 and CH-92A which are currently contentious. The RSF has routinely shot down a number of these drone systems.
CH-95 belongs to unmanned aircraft of the MALE (Medium altitude, Long endurance) class, according to available information, its development began in 2005, the first flight tests began in 2009, so that the aircraft would have its first public display in 2010 at the international aerospace at the China International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai.
Externally, the CH-95 is very similar to the CH-92A, but is significantly larger. The length of the aircraft is 9.05 m, height 2.77 m, wingspan 20.5 m. The maximum take-off mass is 1100 kg, the maximum mass of external cargo is 200 kg (there is also information for 260 kg). Flight autonomy is 20 hours, cruising speed is 200 km/h, maximum 280 km/h, maximum distance from the command station 200 km (at that distance, within optical visibility, the command station can receive information collected by the aircraft’s sensors, which can be increased by using another command station), maximum range 4000 km, peak flight 5000 m, take-off runway length 600 m, length of runway 800 m.
The manufacturer states that the basic version of the CH-95 has two underwing hardpoints, and information can also be found that, most likely, the upgraded version has 4 or 6. The armament can be anti-armor laser-guided missiles AKD-10 (export code BA-7 , Blue Arrow 7) weighing 46 kg, range up to 5-7 km, guided missiles FT-10 weighing 25 kg, semi-active laser-guided missile pellets BRM1 caliber 90 mm range up to 8 km, FT-7/130 planing bombs weighing 130 kg and FT-9/50 weighing 50 kg, guided bombs GB-7/50 weighing 50 kg and GB-4/100 weighing 100 kg.
CH-92 drone
Designed by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), the CH-92 is a fixed-wing UAV in the conventional V-tail layout with a tricycle landing gear. Propulsion is provided by a propeller driven by a pusher engine mounted at the empennage. The CH-92 is mainly intended for reconnaissance, surveillance, and attack missions.
CH-95 drone
Also designed by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), the CH-95 is a fixed-wing UAV in the conventional V-tail layout with a tricycle landing gear. It is propelled by a pusher engine mounted at the empennage. The CH-95 can be used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and attack missions.
The CH-95 drones’ maximum take-off weight is 650KG, with a service ceiling of 7000 meters, a combat radius of 250KM within line of sight, an endurance if 6-12 hours.
The drone can be fitted with a day and night photoelectronic reconnaissance platform, SAR/GMTI radar, precision-guided bombs, communication relay and electronic warfare equipment.
Drone warfare in Sudan
Drones have become a key component of the war between the SAF and the RSF, in which two competing generals are fighting over control of the country’s natural resources. Many of those unmanned aerial vehicles are coming from Iran, Russia or the UAE as those countries throw their support behind Sudan’s opposing forces in hopes of securing their own benefits when the war ends.
As a matter of fact, the Rapid Support Force (RSF) operates it’s own fleet of drones, however, this are of different class, and much smaller such as the DJI and other similar quadcopter-style commercially available off-the-shelf drones.
In September, it was reported that “Ukraine’s special services” may be behind a series of drone strikes and a ground operation against the Russian Wagner Group-backed RSF rebels near Sudan’s capital. Video footage obtained by CNN revealed the hallmarks of Ukrainian-style drone attacks with text in Ukrainian reading “Stop.”
The United Arab Emirates and Russia, via the mercenary organization Africa Corps, have supplied the RSF with weapons, fuel and other resources including quadcopter-style drones outfitted to carry and drop 120 mm mortar shells. The SAF has also used this technique.
While some drones are made in Sudan, the influx of drones from abroad violates a United Nations arms embargo on Sudan.
Much of the aid from Russia and the UAE has come through neighboring Chad and Libya. A United Nations report says the UAE supplied the RSF with aid disguised as humanitarian deliveries.
The UAE, which seeks its own Red Sea outpost in Sudan, has supplied the same quadcopter drones to allies in conflict areas such as Ethiopia and Yemen, according to Brian Castner, a weapons expert at Amnesty International.
The use of drones in the conflict in Sudan has raised concerns about civilian casualties and the potential for human rights violations. However, the Sudanese military has stated that it is using the drones in a responsible manner and taking steps to avoid civilian casualties.
The use of drones in conflict is not new, but the proliferation of this technology in recent years has made it more accessible to smaller and less technologically advanced countries like Sudan. The use of drones has the potential to level the playing field in conflicts where one side has air superiority, and can also reduce the risk to pilots.
However, the use of drones also raises concerns about the potential for proliferation and the risk of these weapons falling into the wrong hands. The international community has called for greater regulation and oversight of the use of drones in conflict, and for efforts to prevent the spread of this technology to non-state actors and other countries.
The RSF has used its drones to attack SAF positions, but also has used them to launch assaults on civilian institutions such as a hospital in Omdurman in 2023. The SAF also used drones early in the conflict against civilian sites, including a market frequented by RSF fighters where at least 40 people died during a SAF drone strike.