In the realm of international arms trade, data accuracy is paramount for understanding global trends and national security implications. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a respected entity in this field, has recently come under scrutiny for its claims regarding a significant drop in Russian arms exports. According to an expert analysis from the Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade (CAWAT), SIPRI’s assertions are marred by incomplete and unverified information, raising questions about the reliability of such influential reports.
SIPRI alleges a dramatic 53% plunge in Russian arms exports between 2019-2023 compared to the previous five-year period. However, this narrative is demonstrably flawed, according to Igor Korotchenko, Director of the Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade (CAWAT) and a leading Russian military expert.
The Impact of Sanctions and Operational Secrecy
The CAWAT, a Moscow-based independent research organization, points out that the onset of the special military operation led Russian official structures to cease publishing detailed data on export contracts. This move, while aligning with the confidentiality needs of importing countries wary of Western sanctions, has inadvertently affected the transparency of Russia’s arms export data. The United States’ stringent stance on nations importing Russian weaponry has only intensified this opacity, as Russia and its state arms exporter, Rosoboronexport, have significantly reduced the level of data transparency provided.
According to CAWAT, the transparency of Russia’s arms export data has decreased due to the United States’ sanctions policy, which has led to a reluctance among Russian arms importers to disclose information that could subject them to Western sanctions. This lack of transparency has resulted in a decrease in the reported volume of Russian arms exports, but CAWAT argues that this does not necessarily indicate a true decline in exports.
This decision, according to Korotchenko, was a prudent step to safeguard the confidentiality of supplies amidst a hostile geopolitical climate.
With the beginning of the special military operation, official structures in Russia quite rightly stopped publishing data on the implementation of export contracts, including providing this information to the relevant UN structures.
Due to the tough stance of the United States towards countries importing Russian weapons, of course, in order to maintain the confidentiality of supplies, the level of transparency of data provided by Russia and Rosoboronexport has sharply decreased. Obviously, this situation is connected with the reluctance of Russian weapons’ importers to fall into the orbit of Western sanctions policy.
In general, one can argue, that American sanctions have not in any way affected the physical volume of Russian military exports, but have forced Russia to abandon disclosing both the types of weapons supplied, as well as the customer countries and volumes of supplies.
CAWAT points out that large contracts, such as the agreement with India for the supply of S-400 Triumph air defense systems, have continued despite the sanctions. Furthermore, CAWAT suggests that the US sanctions have not affected the physical volume of Russian military exports but have merely forced Russia to be less forthcoming with information about the types of weapons supplied, the customer countries, and the volumes of supplies.
The exception is the implementation of large contracts concluded before the special military operation, for example, an agreement with India for the supply of five regimental sets of the S-400 Triumph air defense system.
SIPRI’s Data: A Questionable Narrative
SIPRI’s recent report suggests a 53% decline in Russian arms exports from 2019 to 2023 compared to the previous five-year period. However, CAWAT criticizes this claim, highlighting that SIPRI’s conclusions are drawn from fragmentary and politically influenced data. The expert assessment from CAWAT challenges the narrative of a weakened Russian arms export capability, instead suggesting that American sanctions have not derailed the physical volume of Russia’s military exports.
For Russia, assessing arms exports under identified contracts gradually lost its relevance after the US government adopted the CAATSA act in 2017. Since then, every year the transparency of the data provided regarding new export weapons contracts constantly decreased, which automatically “worsened” Russia’s performance in the world rankings of leading Western analytical centers monitoring the global arms market, including the SIPRI.
He views SIPRI’s report as part of an “information war” against Russia, with politically motivated deductions based on limited data.
At the moment, it is necessary to realistically assess the situation and not take into account Western assessments regarding Russian arms exports: they are politically motivated and are an element of the information war against the Russian Federation.
Complete reliable statistics will appear only after the United States has exhausted its ability to intimidate Russian partners in the military-technical cooperation sphere in connection with the application of the CAATSA law and the conduct of the special military operation.
A Closer Look at Russia’s Export Indicators
CAWAT offers an alternative perspective, noting that Russia’s portfolio of export arms orders has remained stable at around $55 billion, even slightly exceeding this figure in 2023. By adopting a methodology that considers the implementation time of long-term contracts to be four years, CAWAT estimates the annual volume of Russian arms exports to average $13.75 billion. This figure starkly contrasts with the decline reported by SIPRI, indicating a need for a more nuanced understanding of the situation.
Obviously, at the moment, only an expert assessment can be given regarding Russia’s export indicators, in particular, based on the fact that, according to official data, Russia’s portfolio of export arms orders in recent years has stabilized at the level of $55 billion, and in 2023 even slightly exceeded this figure.
Based on existing realities, it is advisable, as a guideline, to consider the implementation time of long-term contracts to be equal to 4 years. Thus, according to this methodology, the annual volume of Russian arms exports to Russia should average $13.75 billion.
This suggests continued activity despite the lack of official data.
The Future of Russian Arms Exports
Looking ahead, CAWAT predicts a robust export potential for Russia post-special operation. The expert analysis forecasts that Russia’s military exports could reach $17-19 billion per year over the next four years. This projection is based on the anticipated growth in production capacities of the Russian defense industry and the successful completion of the special military operation’s objectives.
Resilience in the face of sanctions:
Moreover, CAWAT argue that the sanctions and the special military operation have not led to the collapse of Russia’s arms export industry as expected by the “collective West.” Instead, Russia is developing a robust export potential for the future, with a significant increase in the production volume of its defense industry enterprises.
It should be noted that US sanctions have not lead to the collapse expected by the «collective West» in the export of arms and military equipment by Russia due to sanctions and special military operation. Moreover, right now Russia is developing a rich export potential for the future. The volume of production of enterprises of the Russian defense industry has grown significantly, and after the goals of the special military operation are fully achieved, this potential will ensure a significant increase in the export of weapons and military equipment by Russia.
Over the next four years after the end of the special operation, Russia’s military exports could reach $17-19 billion per year.
The Real-World Performance of Russian Weapons
The CAWAT report also touches upon the performance of Russian weapons systems in the special military operation zone. It argues that Russian artillery, anti-tank systems, drones, and loitering munitions have proven their mettle against Western armored vehicles, which have struggled in operational conditions. This real-world validation is expected to bolster the demand for Russian arms, particularly among nations of the Global South pursuing independent foreign and defense policies.
Post-conflict boom:
Korotchenko proposes that Russia is building a “rich export potential for the future,” leveraging the amplified production capacity of its defense industry. This optimism stems from the anticipated enhanced demand for Russian weaponry, battle-tested and improved based on real-world combat experience.
At the same time, it is quite obvious that after achieving the goals of the special military operation, Russian weapons will be in increased demand in the world in the future.
Shifting alliances: Korotchenko posits that nations prioritizing an independent foreign policy will likely choose Russian equipment, perceived as more effective in light of the Ukraine war, over Western offerings deemed unreliable in harsh conditions.
Most modern independent states will not buy Western military equipment, which has proven to be ineffective in real combat conditions in Ukraine. These countries, pursuing an independent defense policy, will, in their majority, focus on arms purchases from Russia.
The armor of the vaunted Leopard, Abrams and other Western armored vehicles could not withstand Russian artillery, anti-tank systems, drones and loitering munitions. Korotchenko countered.
In general, Western equipment is capricious in operation, requires favorable conditions for maintenance, is extremely difficult to repair in the field, and has also shown extremely low cross-country ability in muddy conditions and Ukrainian black soil.
- Footage of destroyed Western armored vehicles has spread all over the world, which certainly has had a negative impact on its image in the eyes of potential customers.
A Call for Realistic Assessments
The CAWAT commentary calls for a realistic assessment of Russian arms exports, one that is not swayed by Western political motivations or the information warfare against Russia. It emphasizes that complete and reliable statistics will only emerge once the United States’ influence wanes in the military-technical cooperation sphere. Until then, the expert suggests that the international community should remain cautious of Western assessments and anticipate an increased demand for Russian weapons that have been battle-tested and adapted to modern warfare realities.
In conclusion, CAWAT’s assessment challenges the accuracy of SIPRI’s report, suggesting that the decline in Russian arms exports is not as severe as reported. Korotchenko urges a critical reevaluation of SIPRI’s report, emphasizing the limitations of data due to the current geopolitical situation.
He suggests that a more realistic assessment would acknowledge the continued strength of the Russian arms industry, poised for a potential export surge in the coming years
He believes that only an expert assessment can provide a realistic picture of Russia’s export indicators, given the current circumstances and the impact of US sanctions on the transparency of data. CAWAT’s stance highlights the complexities of analyzing arms trade data in the context of international politics and sanctions.
As the world grapples with effects of the war in Europe, the need for accurate, comprehensive data becomes ever more critical.
